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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a final order and judgment of a district
court pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This
Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to the Constitution
of Utah, Art. VIII, Sections 3 and 5, and U.C.A. 78-2-2 (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that "as a commercial landlord, Freeport [Appellee] does not owe a
duty of reasonable care to its tenants to protect against loss of
1

or damage to property," especially

in light of this Court's

previous rulings including Williams v. Melbv, 699 P. 2d 723, 726
(Utah 1985) which held that "this Court has charged landlords with
a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their tenants in all
circumstances."

(R.. 1496, 1536).

(References designated by the

letter "R" in this Brief are to the original record as paginated by
the Record Index which was mailed to this Court by the trial court
on or about March 27, 2001).
Standard of Review:

Inasmuch as a challenge to summary

judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, the appellate
court reviews the conclusions for correctness, without deference to
the trial court's legal conclusions.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d

497 (Utah 1989) .
B.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that "Freeport

[Appellee] had no duty to protect its tenant's property from theft
by third persons," especially in light of this Court's previous
rulings including Williams v. Melby, supra, and Mitchell v. Pearson
Enterprises, 697 P. 2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985) which held that "the
fact that the instrumentality which produced the injury . . . was
the criminal conduct of a third person would not preclude a finding
of

proximate

cause

foreseeable act."

if

the

intervening

agency

was

itself

a

(R. 1496, 1536).

Standard of Review:

Bonham v. Morgan, supra.

C. Whether the trial court erred in refusing, as ci matter of
law, to look beyond the contract between the parties and consider
the particular facts of this case in determining whether a landlord
2

(Appellee) had a duty to protect its tenant (Appellant) from loss
or harm, especially in light of previous Utah appellate decisions
including Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah
App. 1994) which held that in a landlord-tenant relationship, "the
care to be exercised

in any particular case depends on the

circumstances of that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger
and must be determined as a question of fact."

(R. 1496, 1536).

Standard of Review: Bonham v. Morgan, supra. Also, the party
against whom summary judgment has been granted is entitled to have
all facts and all inferences fairly rising therefrom considered in
a light most favorable to him. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d
104 (Utah 1991).
D. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that the Lease Agreement between the parties "does not require
Freeport [Appellee] to provide security for Enercofs [Appellant]
goods and it does not require Freeport to provide theft insurance
for the benefit of Enerco."
Standard of Review:

(R. 1535).

Bonham v. Morgan, supra.

E. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that (1) Appellant should not have been covered by Appellee's
insurance, (2) that "Freeport [Appellee] did not have a duty to
obtain or maintain insurance which would cover Enerco [Appellant]
for any loss caused by theft" and (3) that Appellee "had no
contractual or common-law duty to provide that insurance to
Enerco," especially in light of Utah appellate decisions including
GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157,1161 (Utah App. 1994)
3

which held that "the landlord's insurance is presumed to be held
for the tenant's benefit as a co-insured in the absence of an
express agreement to the contrary."
Standard of Review:

(R. 1536).

Bonham v. Morgan, supra.

F. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that "the GNS Partnership v. Fullmer case cited by Enerco is
inapplicable to the facts of this case."
Standard of Review:

(R. 1495, 1536).

Bonham v. Morgan, supra.

G. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that "Freeport [Appellee] is not in the business of storing goods,
for hire and with respect to Enercofs [Appellant's] goods, was not
acting as a warehouseman as contemplated by the UCC."

(R. 1493,

1535).
Standard of Review:

Bonham v. Morgan, supra; Winegar v.

Froerer Corp., supra.
H. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that "Freeport

[Appellee] did not owe Enerco

[Appellant] the

statutory, common law or contract duties of a warehouseman."

(R.

1493, 1535).
Standard of Review:

Id.

I. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that "the lease agreement between the parties did not create a
lease subject to the terms of the UCC," that "U.C.A. 70A-2a-101,
et. seq., including 70A-2a-218 and 219, do not apply in this case,"
and that summary judgment was appropriate "as to any of Enerco!s
claims based on the UCC." (R. 1535).
4

Standard of Review:

Id.

J, Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that Freeport [Appellee] did not breach any provision of the
written lease?

(R. 1535).

Standard of Review:

Id.

In addition to the cases cited, this Court has ruled that a
trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed under a correction of
error standard.

Jacobsen Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n., 839 P.2d

789 (Utah 1992).

Issues of law are reviewed giving no deference to

the views of the lower court.

See, e.g., English v. Kienke, 774

P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Appellant

contends

that

the

following

Constitutional

provisions, statutes and rules are determinative or of central
importance to this appeal:
1.

Constitution of Utah, Art, I, Sec, 11;
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this state,
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party.

2.

Constitution of Utah, Art, I, Sec, 24:
All laws of a general nature
uniform operation.

3.

shall have

U,C.A, S70A-l-102m (Uniform Commercial Code):
This act shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and
5

policies.
4.

U.C.A. S 7 0 A - 7 - 1 0 2 m m :
"Goods" means all things which are treated as
moveable for the purposes of a contract of
storage or transportation,

5.

U.C.A. S70A-7-102fm:
"Warehouseman" is a person engaged
business of storing goods for hire.

6.

in the

U.C.A. S70A-7-204m;
A warehouseman is liable for damages for loss
of or injury to the goods caused by his
failure to exercise such care in regard to
them as a reasonably careful man would
exercise under like circumstances but unless
otherwise agreed he is not liable for damages
which could not have been avoided by the
exercise of such care.

7.

Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with any affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this case, Appellant, Enerco, Inc. (hereinafter "Enerco")

leased a large commercial building from Appellee, Freeport Center
Associates (hereinafter "Freeport") pursuant to a written Lease
Agreement.

After several million dollars of property was stolen

from the commercial building, Enerco brought suit against Freeport
and others.

(The relevant facts will be discussed in more detail

in the "Statement of Facts" below.)

6

After the case was filed, Enerco reached settlement agreements
with SOS Staffing Services, Inc., Atlas Steel, Inc., and Wasatch
Metal, Inc., and those three defendants were dismissed from this
suit (R. 637, 1220 and 1227).

After written discovery commenced,

Freeport filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1234).
After hearing oral argument, the trial court published its
"Ruling on Defendant Freeport Centerfs Motion for Summary Judgment"
(R. 1490), and Freeport submitted a proposed Order.

Appellant

filed a "Notice of Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order and
Judgment Regarding Freeport Center's Motion for Summary Judgment"
(R. 1511) which requested that in signing the Order granting
summary judgment, the trial court should (1) make an express
determination that there was no just reason for delay and make an
express direction for the entry of final judgment pursuant to Rule
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, and

(2) stay further

proceedings in the trial court, pending this appeal, against the
only other remaining defendant (L. Bloom & Son, Ogden) because the
claims against that defendant were completely separate from those
against Freeport.
The trial court granted Enerco's request and certified its
Order as final in a "Final Order, Judgment and Stay" (R. 1534).
After the summary judgment was entered against Enerco, the trial
court's "Final Order, Judgment and Stay" was appealed to this
Court. All procedural requirements including filing of the Notice
of Appeal and filing of the Docketing Statement have been timely
fulfilled.
7

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Enerco is a Delaware corporation which is in the

business of purchasing equipment and other materials categorized as
"surplus" from rhe U.S. Government

in large "lots" and then

reselling those items to many other individuals, governments and
business entities throughout the world.
2.

(R. 646-47, 1353-54).

Beginning in 1993 (and then for successive periods

thereafter), Freeport and Enerco entered into a written Lease
Agreement by which Enerco leased one of many large warehouses
located in Appellant's commercial facility (known as the Freeport,
Center) in Clearfield, Utah.

Pursuant to that Lease Agreement,

Enerco paid Freeport a monthly fee to store many millions of
dollars worth of equipment and materials in the wctrehouse for
future sales to its worldwide customers. (R. 647, 1354).
3.

In late 1995, plaintiff!s Managing Director, James

Kim, was going on an extended trip overseas, and because he would
not be in Utah, he terminated all temporary employees so that no
one would be in or have access to the building.
4.

(R. 649, 1354).

After Kim left town, a former temporary employee,

originally provided by defendant SOS, returned to the warehouse*,
gained access through the back door, and began stealing large
amounts of goods and materials stored in the warehouse.
1354).

8

(R. 649,

5.

Over the next many days, numerous other individuals

entered onto Freeport's property and into the warehouse with
trailers, flatbed trucks and other vehicles to remove Enerco!s
property.

(R. 649, 1354).
6.

Freeport!s front office knew that Mr. Kim often went

overseas on extended trips, and also knew that while he was on such
trips, no one worked in or entered into Enercofs warehouse.
Indeed, when Mr. Kim went on such trips, he would leave his keys to
the warehouse with Freeportfs front office so that no one else
could gain access to the warehouse.
7.

(R. 1423, 1354-55).

Prior to leaving on the above-referenced trip, Mr.

Kim specifically informed Freeport's management that he would be
out of town for an extended period of time and, as was his usual
practice, he gave Freeportfs management his keys so that no one
else could gain access to his building.

All of the thefts in

question occurred while Freeport had plaintiff's keys and knew he
was out of town.

(R. 1423, 1354-55).

Kim,

(R.

par.

13,

1422-23);

See also Affidavit of James

Answer

No.

3

to

Freeportfs

Interrogatories, attached as Ex. "A" to "Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Freeport Center Associates1

Motion for Summary

Judgment (R. 1382-86).
8.

As indicated above, the thieves transported the

stolen goods by using, among other things, a flatbed trailer.
However, that trailer was pulled by a white Cadillac, with out-ofstate license plates, and the property and materials on the trailer
were not even covered.

SOS's former employee admitted to the
9

thefts and provided information regarding thefts by other people.
He participated

in taking more than twenty trailer

loads of

Enerco!s property out of the warehouse and indicated that as they
drove by Freeport's security guards at the gate, those guards made
no effort whatsoever to stop them and simply waved as they left the
premises again and again.

(R. 649-50, 1355).

See also Transcript

of Statement given by Larry Davis, attached as Exhibit "B" to
"Memorandum in Support of Freeport Center Associates1 Motion for
Summary Judgment" (R. 1284-85).
S0Sfs former employee who stole much of the property"

9.

stated that as they would approach Freeportf s guards at the gate
with these loads, he would tell his cohort:
Hey, there's no way we can drive out of here
with it like this, my God, it's just hanging
off the truck, and we drove right out the door
and a guy waved at us going out the gate,
right out the main gate.
(Id.).
10.

The materials piled on the trailers cind "hanging

off" included large unique and readily-identifiable items such as *
aircraft

wings,

generators.

military

tug

vehicles,

and

large

military

(R. 1284-85, 1355).

11.

The Lease Agreement fully acknowledged that Enerco

would "use the premises for . . . storage and distribution of
Tenant's products and materials." Freeport's management was aware
of the unique type of equipment and materials Enerco had in the
warehouse, and was also
equipment.

aware of

the

large volume of that

(Lease Agreement, par. 2 (R. 1269); Affidavit of James
10

Kim, par, 5, (R. 1421)).
12.

By the time Mr. Kim returned from overseas, a large

amount of property, the value of which is estimated to be in excess
of $7 million, had been stolen from the warehouse and disposed of
by various businesses and recyclers, including those named as
defendants in this case.
13.

(R. 651, 1355).

At the time the lease was entered into, Mr. Kim

spoke with Freeport fs Manager and because of the high value of
Enerco's property, specifically questioned him about security at
the Freeport Center.

Freeportfs Manager gave Mr. Kim verbal

assurances and representations
Freeport Center.

regarding the security at the

Among other things, Mr. Kim was told that there

would be security guards protecting the gate at the Freeport
Center, that "there is ample security here," that Enerco's property
would be safe, and that he had never heard of anyone stealing from
Freeport's tenants.
14.

(James Kim Affidavit, par. 7, R. 1421).

These statements were important to Mr. Kim in

deciding to store Enerco's valuable goods at the Freeport Center,
and he relied upon them in making the decision to do so.

(James

Kim Affidavit, par. 8. R. 1421).
15.

Mr. Kim was also given other materials at the time

the lease arrangements were made.

In those materials, it was

unequivocally stated, among other things, that "Freeport Center is
protected by five miles of ten foot chain link fencing" and "a
roving security guard patrols the center's 735 acres on weekends,
at night and on holidays." (James Kim Affidavit, par. 9, R. 1422).
11

16.

The materials given to Mr. Kim also represent that

Freeport is protected by "an electronic surveillance system" which
is connected with "the Freeport Center Administrative Offices and
patrol vehicle."

James Kim also relied on these materials and the

representations and promises made therein.

(James Kim Affidavit,

par. 10, R. 1422).
17.

While Mr. Kim was gone on his long overseas trip,

thieves also gained access to the building by kicking in the back
door, and one of the big metal lift-up doors "had been kicked into
pieces in order to gain access."
18.

(R.

1301, 1358).

Regarding insurance, the Lease Agreement specified:

Tenant will not permit the demised
premises to be used for any purpose .
which would cause an increase in insurance
premiums, render the insurance thereon void or
cause cancellation thereof.
(R. 1269).
19.

The Lease Agreement further specified regarding

insurance that:
Tenant shall also pay to Landlord any amount
by which the property insurance premiums
allocable to the demised premises for any year
during the term of this Lease exceed the
annual premium . . . presently paid by
Landlord for the demised premises prior to
Tenant's occupancy.
. . . Landlord will
provide Tenant with a complete computation of
any premium increase on the demised premises
and within thirty (30) days thereafter Tenant
will pay Landlord the insurance premium
increase as set forth in the computation.
(R. 1271).
20.

The Lease Agreement further specified regarding

insurance that:
12

Landlord and Tenant each further warrant that
insurance companies insuring Landlord or
Tenant shall have no rights against the other,
whether
by
assignment,
subrogation
or
otherwise.
(R. 1272).
21.

The

Lease

Agreement

specified

that

ff

[iInterpretation, construction and performance of this Lease shall

be governed by the laws of Utah."

(R. 1275).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah law mandates that Landlords have duties to exercise
reasonable

care

"in

all

circumstances."

This

Court

has

unequivocally held that with regard to landlord cases, "the care to
be exercised in any particular case depends on the circumstances of
that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved, and
must be determined as a question of fact."

The trial court erred

in holding, as a matter of law, that Freeport had no duty of
reasonable care to Enerco.
It was certainly foreseeable that Freeportfs

failure to

provide adequate security would allow, if not encourage, exactly
what occurred in this case.

Furthermore, Freeport1s general duty

in this case was increased by the fact that it actually undertook
to render security services by providing guards at the gate, roving
security guards, etc.
Utah law requires that "the landlord's insurance is presumed
to be held for the tenant's benefit as a co-insured in the absence
of an express agreement to the contrary."

In this case, no such

agreement to the contrary exists and in fact, the Lease Agreement
13

makes it clear that the parties contemplated insurance being in
place and that no subrogation rights would exist against each
other, as is required in all co-insured situations.
Freepcrt owed Snerco the duties of a warehouseman, and is
statutorily liable for the loss of Enerco's goods. The actions set
forth herein breached the contract between the parties, and any
ambiguities must be construed against Freeport.

For all of these

reasons, an award of summary judgment was inappropriate.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
The trial court failed to consider and apply the strict
standards which must be applied to summary judgment motions. This
Court has unequivocally held that "summary judgment is proper only
if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Bowen v.

Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982), emphasis added.

This

Court has also mandated that
If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of the opposing party.
Thus, the court must evaluate all the evidence
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn
from the evidence in a light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment.
Id. at 436, see also Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977).
Finally, this Court has held that when the case involves claims of
negligence, summary judgment "is appropriate only in the most
clear-cut case."

Bowen, supra at 436.
14

Enerco offered overwhelming evidence to the trial court that
Freeport was negligent in this case. When that evidence is further
viewed "in a light most favorable" to Enerco and when "any doubt or
uncertainty concerning questions of fact" is resolved in Enerco's
favor, as it must be, Freeportfs motion should have been denied.
As is discussed below, the agreements in question, Utah
statutory law, and Utah case law all required Freeport to properly
protect plaintiff's property-

Reasonable minds could certainly

differ as to whether Freeport did so.

For example, reasonable

minds could differ as to whether Freeport!s guards should have been
suspicious of a Cadillac with out-of-state plates pulling a flatbed trailer, driven by unkempt individuals with long hair, driving
past the guards more than twenty times with Enercofs aircraft
wings, sensitive electronics equipment, military tug vehicles, and
plaintiff's other high-tech military equipment loaded on the back
and hanging off the sides. As indicated in the statement of facts
above, even the thieves themselves were shocked that the guards did
nothing and just repeatedly waved to them as they drove out.
Reasonable minds could certainly differ as to whether the
security guards should have waved at this spectacle when Freeport
knew no one else in the facility had this type of equipment, that
it had plaintiff's keys, that James Kim was out of town, and that
there was no reason to be moving his inventory because he had not
ended his lease.

Reasonable minds could certainly differ whether

Freeport!s promised "roving security guards" should have seen the
large metal door to plaintiff's warehouse repeatedly kicked in and
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in pieces.

Reasonable minds could certainly diff€*r why the

"surveillance system" Freeport had promised was not in operation
and whether it would have prevented the thefts from occurring.
?oiat I*

Saerco's Negligence Claim was Improperly Dismissed

The trial court incorrectly ordered that Enerco's negligence
claim should be dismissed.

Its basis for doing so was its holding

that "[a]s a commercial landlord, Freeport does not owe a duty of
reasonable care to its tenants to protect against loss of or damage
to property" and its related holding that "Freeport had no duty to
protect its tenant's property from third persons, except as may
arise by agreement of the parties."

(R. 1536).

Utah case law has repeatedly recognized the common law duty of
a landlord to protect its tenants. In Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848
(Utah 1981), this Court flatly stated that "the duty of the
landlord to use reasonable care to protect lessees may rest on
common law principles of negligence."

Id. at 850.

In Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), this Court
enlarged those duties and noted that "the common law duty of a
landlord

has been expanded

in virtually

every state, either

judicially or by statute, beyond the narrow common law categories."
Id. at 726.

The Court explained that "this court has charged

landlords with a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their
tenants in all circumstances.

Landlord liability is no longer

limited by the artificial categories developed by the common law."
Id. at 726, emphasis added.
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This

Court

also noted

that

"in the

instant

case, the

landlord's duty was to use reasonable care" and then made the
significant ruling that "whether a defendant has breached the
required standard of care is generally a question for the jury,"
Id, at 727. Important to this case is the fact that the Court also
held that "summary judgment should be granted with great caution in
negligence cases" (Id., at 725) and then concluded that "the care to
be exercised in any particular case depends upon the circumstances
of that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved and
must be determined as a question of fact."

Id. at 727, emphasis

added.
As

indicated

above,

"the

care to be

exercised

in any

particular case depends upon . . . the extent of foreseeable danger
involved," and this is equally true when, as in this case, the
injury was produced by the criminal conduct of a third person. For
example, in Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah
1985), this Court discussed the duties of innkeepers to their
clients and clearly held that "the fact that the instrumentality
which produced the injury . . . was the criminal conduct of a third
person would not preclude a finding of proximate cause if the
intervening agency was itself a foreseeable act. JEd. at 246.
Like the innkeeper in Mitchell, Freeport is a commercial
entity which, for a set fee, provides temporary premises to a
client for a fixed period of time.

In Mitchell, this Court

explained that innkeepers owe a duty of "ordinary care to see that
the premises assigned to [clients] are reasonably safe for their
17

use and

occupancy."

J^d. at

243,

Regarding

the

issue of

negligence, this Court held that "it is foreseeable that an
innkeeper's failure to maintain adequate security measures not only
permits but may sven encourage intruders to rob

. . . hotel

patrons." Id., emphasis added. This Court then stated:

"Thus, in

meeting its standard of ordinary care, a hotel must provide
security commensurate with the facts and circumstances that are or
should be apparent to the ordinary prudent person."

Id., emphasis

added.
It is important to note that both innkeepers and warehouses s
are also specifically categorized by Utah law as "public servants"
who "may not contract to escape potential liabilities for their
ordinary negligence."

Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901f

907 (Utah App. 1995).

If it is foreseeable that a hotel's "failure

to maintain adequate security measures" would not only permit, but
"may even encourage intruders to rob" clients, it is certainly
foreseeable that the exact same failure would at least permit, and
probably encourage intruders to do the same at the Freeport Center.
A nation-wide review of cases indicates that other states have
also extended landlords1 duties in cases specifically involving the
criminal conduct of third persons.

For example, in Braitman v.

Overlook Terrace Corp., 132 N.J. Super. 51, 332 A. 2d 212 (1974),
the court, referring to other state and federal cases, stated that
"a landlord does owe a duty to take reasonable steps to protect a
tenant from foreseeable criminal acts committed by third persons."
Id. at 214.
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In Vermes v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 251 N.W.2d 101 (Minn.
1977), the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed a case in which, as in
the present case, a business brought suit against its landlord
because the business' inventory had been stolen.

While the

landlord apparently accepted the inescapable fact that it owed a
duty of protection to the tenant, it argued that the burglary was
an "intervening cause" which relieved it from liability.

In

rejecting this argument the court explained:
To succeed with this line of argument, [Landlord] must
show that the burglary was not "reasonably foreseeable"
under the circumstances. Prosser analyzes the general
problem and the specific case of criminal acts as
follows:
"If the intervening cause is one which in
ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has
reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, he may be negligent, among
other reasons, because he has failed to guard
against it; or he may be negligent only for
that reason.
The same is true as to those intervening
intentional or criminal acts which the
defendant might reasonably anticipate, and
against which he would be required to take
precautions." [Citation omitted].
Id. at 105, emphasis added.
The trial court suggested that Freeport did not "owe a duty of
reasonable care to it tenants" because it is a commercial landlord.
However, this Court has never limited the above-referenced duty of
reasonable care to non-commercial

landlords, but instead used

extremely broad language in indicating that "this court has charged
landlords with a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their
tenants in all circumstances."

Williams, supra at 726, emphasis
19

added.
cases

It is also important to note that in the above-referenced
from

commercial

other
tenants

states,
should

it was
be

never

treated

even

suggested

differently

than

that
non-

commercial tenants.
Limiting the duty of "reasonable care" to non-commercial
tenants, as the trial court proposes, not only violates this
Court's "all circumstances" mandate, but would also violate the
Utah Constitution's guarantee that "[a]11 laws of a general nature
shall have uniform operation."
24).

(Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec.

There is no justifiable reason to apply a duty of reasonable

care to one group of tenants but not to another. Any tenant should
have the right to equal protection under the law and the trial
court simply offered no explanation as to why "all circumstances"
should somehow exclude commercial tenants.
Furthermore, it is almost universally accepted that if a
landlord chooses to provide security, his general duty increases.
For example, in Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506 (Idaho
1990), the plaintiff sued the property manager of a commercial
building.

As this Court has held, the Idaho Supreme Court held

that "a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in
light of all the circumstances" and that "it is for a jury to
decide whether that duty was breached."

Id., at 509.

The court

then held:
One who voluntarily assumes a duty also assures the
obligation of due care in performance of that duty. A
landlord, having voluntarily provided a security system,
is potentially subject to liability if the security
system fails as a result of the landlord1s negligence.
Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987) (having
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provided security, owner must anticipate conduct of third
persons) [other citations omitted].
This Court has ruled likewise.

In DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm

Company, 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983) this Court explained:
A majority of jurisdictions, like Utah, have recognized
a duty to exercise reasonable care on the part of one who
undertakes to render services. Restatement (Second) of
Torts formulates this principle as follows: "One who
undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the other!s person or
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care to perform his undertaking if (a) his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance
upon the undertaking."
Id. at 436, emphasis added.

There is no question that Freeport

"undertook to render services." It had (or at least represented it
had) a surveillance system.

It had guards at its gate.

It had

roving security guards to protect the premises. Having undertaken
the

service of

providing

security,

Freeport

is

"subject to

liability . . . for physical harm resulting from [its] failure to
exercise reasonable care to perform [its] undertaking."
Freeport did have a duty to exercise reasonable care, its
duties were increased when it actually undertook to render security
services, and this Court has already specifically ruled in a
landlord case that "the care to be exercised in any particular case
depends upon the circumstances of that case and on the extent of
foreseeable danger involved and must be determined as a question of
fact.11

For all of these reasons, the trial court erred in holding

that Freeport does not owe such duties and that, as a matter of
law, Enerco's negligence claims should be dismissed.
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Point II. Enerco Should be Covered as a Co-Insured
Under Freeport*s Insurance Policy
Enerco feels strongly that the trial court erred in holding
that Enerco should not have been covered by Freeport's insurance
policy and that "the GNS Partnership v. Fullmer case cited by
Enerco is inapplicable to the facts of this case,"

(R. 1536).

As

set forth above, paragraph 3 of the Lease Agreement clearly
contemplates that Freeport would maintain insurance protection on
the warehouse in question because the agreement instructed Enerco
not to do anything "which would cause an increase in insurance
premiums, render the insurance thereon void or cause cancellation
thereof."

(Emphasis added).

Likewise, paragraph 13(B) of the

Lease Agreement even specified, to the penny, what the insurance
premium would be, and required Enerco to contribute additional
funds if the premium exceeded that amount.

(R. 1271).

These contractual provisions, which leave no question that
Freeport would have insurance on the building, are critical because
Utah law has mandated that a tenant is a co-insured under its
landlord's insurance policy.

In GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873

P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1994), the court referred to the overwhelming
majority of American cases and explained that "the meijority hold
the landlord's insurance is presumed to be held for the tenant's
benefit as a co-insured in the absence of an express agreement to
the contrary."

Id. at 1161, emphasis added.

The court indicated that "we find the majority view to be more
persuasive" (id.) and went on to explain that "the landlords, of
course, could have held out for an agreement that the tsmant would
22

furnish . . . insurance on the premises.

But they did not. They

elected to themselves purchase the coverage."

Id.

In this case, Freeport likewise could have "held out for an
agreement that the tenant would furnish insurance on the premises."
Not only did it not do so, but it repeatedly indicated in the Lease
Agreement that .it would do so. Enercofs only obligation was to pay
any amounts which "exceeded" Freeportfs premium.
Clearly, making Enerco a co-insured under Freeport!s policy
will restrict certain rights which Freeportfs insurer would have
had against Enerco (such as Freeport!s insurer's right to subrogate
against Enerco).

However, no prejudice will occur to Freeport or

its insurer because paragraph 15(B) of the Lease Agreement itself
specified that "Landlord and Tenant each further warrant that
insurance companies insuring Landlord or Tenant shall have no
rights against the other, whether by assignments, subrogation or
otherwise."

(R. 1272, emphasis added).

Obviously,

if Enerco

were not a

co-insured,

Freeport's

insurance company would have rights against Enerco, including the
right to subrogation which exists as to all other non-insureds.
The fact that the Lease agreement specifically excluded that
subrogation

right

is

application

in this

strong

evidence

instance of Utah

of

the

propriety

law holding that

and
"the

landlord's insurance is presumed to be held for the tenant!s
benefit as a co-insured in the absence of an express agreement to
the contrary."
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The trial court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that
Enerco was not covered by Freeport's insurance policy and that the
GNS Partnership case was not applicable to the facts of this case.
Point III, Freeport Owed Enerco the Duties of a ^arshousasaan
The trial court erred in ruling that Freeport "was not acting
as a warehouseman as contemplated by the UCC" and that Freeport
"did not owe Enerco the statutory, common law, or contract duties
of a warehouseman."

(R. 1535).

Part of the Uniform Commercial

Code which Utah has statutorily adopted deals specifically with
warehousers. U.C.A. §70A-7-102 indicates that a "'warehouseman' is
a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire."
(Emphasis added).
indicates

that

organization."

The "general definitions" section of the title
a

"'person1

includes

an

individual

or

an

(U.C.A. 70A-1-201(30)).

The term "goods" is defined as "all things which are treated
as

movable

for

transportation."

the

purposes

of

a

contract

(U.C.A. 70A-7-102(l)(f)).

of

storage

or

Enerco's property

constituted "goods" under the statute and Freeport is a warehouser
under the statute.
This designation is important because the statute goes on to
specifically mandate that:
A warehouseman is liable for damages for
loss of or injury to the goods caused by his
failure to exercise such reasonable care in
regard to them as a reasonably careful man
would exercise under like circumstances but
unless otherwise agreed he is not liable for
damages which could not have been avoided by
the exercise of such care.
U.C.A. 70A-7-204(l), emphasis added. Enerco believes that pursuant
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to this statute, Freeport has not only a common-law duty to
exercise reasonable care, but also a statutory duty to do the same.
Even if this Court rules that Freeport is not bound by the UCC,
this statute conclusively shows that under Utah law, a tenant which
has entered into a "lease contract" for purely commercial reasons
is entitled to a duty of "reasonable care."
Point IV,

Freeport Breached it Contract in This Case

Although the trial court ruled in favor of Enerco on its claim
that Freeport breached implied contracts, it erred in ruling that
"Freeport did not breach any provision of the written Lease.
1535).

Paragraph 15 of the Lease Agreement

(R.

mandates that !f[i]f

the demised premises or any part thereof shall be damaged or
destroyed by fire or other casualty. Landlord shall promptly repair
all such damage and restore the demised premises without expense to
Tenant."

(R. 1272).

Paragraph 29 of the Lease Agreement requires

that "[t]ime is of the essence of this Lease and every term,
covenant and condition herein contained."

(R. 1277).

The doors were not repaired, especially in a timely manner, as
they were kicked in and "left in pieces" for the perpetrators to
gain access night after night for an extended period of time. Such
constituted a breach by Freeport of the express provisions of the
agreement.
While Enerco believes the above-quoted provisions of the Lease
are

clear

regarding

the

landlord's

obligations

to

provide

insurance, provide security, and promptly repair damage, at a
minimum, they create ambiguities which must be construed against
25

Freeport-

In addition to the requirement to view all evidence in

a light most favorable to plaintiff, Utah law requires that in all
situations, "any ambiguity in a lease shall be construed against
the lessor."

Edwards and Daniels v. Farmers Properties, 865 P.,2d

1382, 1386, n.5 (Utah App. 1993), emphasis added. This law applies
not only to lease agreements, but also to any other types of
contracts:
The well-established rule in Utah is that any
uncertainty with respect to construction of a
contract should be resolved against the party
who has drawn the agreement.
Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982).

In this case,

the written Lease Agreement was drafted entirely by Freeport and
therefore, the contract must be construed against it.
Although Enerco believes the above-referenced provisions in
the Lease Agreement unambiguously imposed obligations on Freeport
which Freeport did not fulfill, to the extent those provisions
create ambiguities, those ambiguities also enable this court to
consider other extrinsic evidence (including the sales brochure,
the testimony of James Kim, verbal promises made by Freeport
employees, etc.).
ambiguous,

the

This Court has held that "if a contract is

court

may

consider

the

party!s

actions

performance as evidence of the partyfs true intention."

and

Platesau

Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990).
See also Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359
(Utah 1996): "Once a contract is found to be ambiguous, a court may
consider extrinsic evidence to determine its meaning."
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Not only do ambiguities allow the court to consider extrinsic
evidence, but they also preclude granting summary judgment as a
matter of law:
Only when contract terms are complete, clear,
and unambiguous can they be interpreted by the
judge on a motion for summary judgment.
[Citation omitted.] If the evidence as to the
terms of an agreement is in conflict, the
intent of the parties as to the terms of the
agreement is to be determined by the jury.
Colonial Leasing Company v. Larsen Brothers Construction, 731 P.2d
481, 488 (Utah 1986).

Even more recently, this Court held:

A motion for summary judgment may not be
granted if a legal conclusion is reached that
an ambiguity exists in the contract and there
is a factual issue as to what the parties
intended.
When ambiguity does exist, the intent of
the parties is a question of fact to be
determined by the jury. Failure to resolve an
ambiguity by determining the parties1 intent
from parol evidence is error.
Plateau Mining, supra at 725.
The Lease Agreement's promises, including that insurance
protection would be maintained on the warehouse in question and
that Freeport would promptly repair all damages, create, at a
minimum, ambiguities as to Freeport!s duties.

Those ambiguities

must be construed against Freeport because it drafted the Lease.
Those ambiguities also allow consideration of extrinsic evidence
including Freeport's sale brochures, verbal promises and other
actions of Freeportfs employees. The trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on Enerco's breach of contract claim.
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CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is only appropriate if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. All the evidence must be evaluated in a light
most favorable to Enerco, and any doubt or uncertainty must be
resolved in its favor.

When cases involve negligence, summary

judgment is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case.
Utah law mandates that Landlords have duties to exercise
reasonable

care

"in

all

circumstances."

This

Court

has

unequivocally held that with regard to landlord cases, "the care to
be exercised in any particular case depends on the circumstances of
that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved, and
must be determined as a question of fact."

It was certainly

foreseeable that Freeport's failure to provide adequate security
would allow, if not encourage, exactly what occurred in this case.,
Furthermore, Freeport's general duty in this case was increased by
the fact that it actually undertook to render security services by
providing guards at the gate, roving security guards, etc.
Utah law requires that "the landlord's insurance is presumed
to be held for the tenant's benefit as a co-insured in the absence
of an express agreement to the contrary." No such agreement to the
contrary exists and in fact, the Lease Agreement makes it clear
that the parties contemplated insurance being in place and that no
subrogation rights would exist against each other, as is required
in all co-insured situations.
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Freeport owed Enerco the duties of a warehouseman, and is
statutorily liable for the loss of Enerco!s goods.

All of the

actions set forth herein breached the contract between the parties,
and any ambiguities must be construed against Freeport.
For all of these reasons, Enerco submits that the trial court
erred and respectfully requests that the judgment entered in favor
of Freeport be reversed as set forth herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

// ^

day of June, 2001.

Miohael L. Schwab
Lloyd A. Hardcastle
Attorneys for Appellant
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10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
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APPENDIX "A"

FILED
AUG 1 6 2000

Michael L. Schwab [A4662]
Lloyd A. Hardcastle [A5079]
SCHWAB & HARDCASTLE
225 South 200 West
P.O. Box 118
Farmington, Utah 84025-0118
Telephone: (801) 451-6560
Fax: (801) 451-8216
Attorneys for Plaintiff

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
ENERCO, INC.,
FINAL ORDER, JUDGMENT AND STAY
Plaintiff,

vs.
Civil No.: 970700262 CN

SOS STAFFING SERVICES, INC.,
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES,
et al.,

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendants.
This Court signed a "Ruling on Defendant Freeport Center's
Motion for Summary

Judgment"

on or

about January

11, 2000.

Thereafter, defendant Freeport Center ("Freeport") submitted a
proposed "Order and Judgment Regarding Freeport Center's Motion for
Summary Judgment."
After receiving the proposed Order, plaintiff ("Enerco") filed
a Notice of Objection, which made certain objections to Freeportfs
proposed Order and which requested that the Order signed by the
Court be certified as a final order and judgment pursuant to Rule
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
A hearing on plaintiff's Notice of Objection was held before

K

this Court on July 18, 2000, at which time the Court heard oral
argument from both counsel of record. Having heard that argument,
reviewed

the

relevant

pleadings,

and

good

cause

appearing

therefore, the Court makes the findings and conclusions set forth
herein and hereby DECREES, ADJUDGES, and ENTERS A FINAL ORDER AND
JUDGMENT as follows:
1.
and

Freeport is not in the business of storing goods for hire*

with

respect

to

Enerco's

goods,

warehouseman as contemplated by the UCC.

was

not

acting

as

a

Therefore, Freeport did

not owe Enerco the statutory, common law or contract duties of at
warehouseman.

Summary judgment is granted to Freeport as to any

claims based on the duties of a warehouseman.
2.

The lease agreement between the parties did not create ct

lease subject to the terms of the UCC.

Specifically, U.C.A. 70A-

2a-101, et. seq., including 70A-2a-218 and 219, do not apply in
this case.

Summary judgment is granted to Freeport as to any of

Enercofs claims based on the UCC.
3.

The written lease agreement between Enerco and Freeport

is valid and enforceable. That agreement does not require Freeport
to provide security for Enerco!s goods and it does not require
Freeport to provide theft insurance for the benefit of Enerco.
Freeport did not breach any provision

of the written lease.

Specifically, it did not breach the lease by failing to repair a
door as alleged by Enerco, because there was no written notice
given by Enerco concerning the door.

Summary judgment is granted

to Freeport and against Enerco as to any of Enerco! s claims for
2

& '"Y
breach of the written lease agreement.
4.

Under Utah law, Freeport did not have a duty to obtain or

maintain insurance which would cover Enerco for any loss caused by
theft.

It had no contractual or common-law duty to provide that

insurance to Enerco. The GNS Partnership v. Fullmer case cited by
Enerco is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Summary judgment
is granted to Freeport and against Enerco as to claims that Enerco
should have been covered by or added to Freeport!s insurance
policy.
5.

As a commercial landlord, Freeport does not owe a duty of

reasonable care to its tenants to protect against loss of or damage
to property. Freeport had no duty to protect its tenant's property
from theft by third persons, except as may arise by agreement of
the parties.

Summary judgment is granted to Freeport and against

Enerco as to all of Enerco1s claims based on negligence.
6.

As to Enerco's claims that the parties entered into

implied agreements whereby Freeport would provide security for
Enercofs property, the Court finds that there are contested issues
of fact. Summary judgment is therefore denied as to Enerco!s claim
for breach of implied contracts.
7.

Regarding this Order and Judgment, specifically all

matters on which summary judgment has been granted above, the Court
hereby makes an express direction for the entry of final judgment,
further makes the express determination that there is no just
reason for delay of its entry, and certifies this Order and
Judgment as final for appeal.
3

Pursuant to Enercofs request under Rule 62, Utah Rules of

8.

Civil Procedure, the Court hereby stays enforcement of the judgment
and other proceedings before this Court so that Enerco may pursue
an appeal, This stay shall not prohibit counsel from voluntarily
agreeing between themselves to conduct additional investigation, or
seeking

assistance

from

the

Court

which

either

deems

is

appropriate.
DATED this

\5

day of HlAQa<A"

, 2000.

BY THE COURT:
DARWIN C. HANSEN
DISTRICT JUDGE

Honorable Rodney S. Page
Second District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of August, 2000, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
John R. Lund, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Theodore R. Weckel
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C.
1220 North Main Street, #5A
P.O. Box 781
Springville, UT 84663
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APPENDIX "B"

7 R E E P 0 R T

C E N T E R

A S S O C I A T E S

CLEARFIELD, UTAH
L E A S E

This Lease made and entered into this
July

19

9th

day of

93 . by and between FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES,

hereinafter called "Landlord", and

ENERCO INC.

,

hereinafter called "Tenant."

W I T N E S S E T H :
In consideration of the covenants and agreements of the
respective parties herein contained, the parties hereto do hereby
agree as follows:
DEMISED PREMISES
Landlord hereby leases to Tenant, and Tenant hires from
Landlord the premises described on Exhibit "A" annexed hereto as a
part hereof, together with the improvements thereon (hereinafter
referred to as the "demised premises" or "premises") for the term
and upon the rental and the covenants and agreements of the
respective parties herein set forth.

Said premises are located in

the City of Clearfield, County of Davis, State of Utah.
TERM
The term of this Lease shall be
six Months
beginning on the
1st
day of
August
19 93 , and ending on
the 31st
day of
January
19 94 . both dates inclusive,
unless sooner terminated as herein provided.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF LEASE
This Lease is made on the following terms and conditions
which are expressly covenanted and agreed to by Landlord and
Tenant:
1. RENT: Tenant agrees to pay as rental to Landlord at
the office of Landlord, Clearfield, Utah, or at such other place as
Landlord may from time to time designate in writing, without any
offset or deduction whatsoever, the total sum of
Twelve
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty and No/100 Dollars ($ 12,480.00 )
over the term of this Lease in lawful money of the United States in
monthly installments of
Two Thousand Eighty and No7100
Dollars fS2.080.00 ) due and payable on the first day of each month
(the "rent"). Any other amounts or expenses payable by Tenant to

Landlord

under

this

Lease,

including

amounts

payable

under

Paragraphs 13 and 24, shall be payable upon the rendition of the
Landlord's Statement therefor. If Tenant shall fail to pay the
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rent within five (5) days after the first day of the month, or
shall fail to pay any other amounts payable by Tenant pursuant to
the provisions of this Lease within ten (10) days after the
rendition of the Landlord1s Statement. Tenant shall pay Landlord
interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum, which interest shall
run from either (a) the day when the Rent was due, (b) the date
Landlord's Statement for certain increases under Paragraph 13 is
sent to Tenant, or (c) for any other amounts or expenses payable by
Tenant, the date of Landlord's expenditures. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, Landlord shall have all legal remedies available for the
enforcement of the payment of rent and other expenses of Tenant
hereunder, including the power to evict for nonpayment of rent or
other expenses of tenant as provided in Paragraph 24.
2. AUTHORIZED USE: Tenant shall use the premises for
the following purpose and for no other purpose whatsoever, without
the written consent of the Landlord first had and obtained:
Storage and distribution of Tenant's products
and materials.
Tenant represents and covenants that it will not produce,
store or use any hazardous or toxic waste or substance, PCB, dioxin
or asbestos on the premises.
3. INCREASING INSURANCE RISK: Tenant will not permit
the demised premises to be used for any purpose, other than those
noted in Paragraph 2, which would cause an increase in insurance
premiums, render the insurance thereon void or cause cancellation
thereof. In the event the insurance is cancelled because of a
change in Tenant's use of the premises, Tenant will be liable for
any loss or damage to the building occurring before reinstatement
or replacement of that insurance.
4. CONDITION OP THE PREMISES: Tenant has inspected the
demised premises including all equipment which is a part thereof
and accepts the premises in the condition they are in at the time
of the commencement of the term of this Lease without any representation express or implied on the part of Landlord or its agents as
to the condition of the premises, or suitability of the premises
for Tenant's use.
5. COMPLIANCE WITH GOVERNMENTAL REQUIREMENTS: Tenant
shall, at Tenant's own expense, comply with all laws, ordinances,
regulations or orders of any federal, state, county, municipal or
other public authority affecting the Tenant's use of the premises
promptly correcting any non-compliance upon discovery thereof and
Landlord hereby consents to any action reasonably taken by Tenant
to correct such non-compliance. Tenant will not commit any waste
on the premises nor permit any obnoxious odors or noise to emanate
from the premises, nor shall it knowingly use or permit the use of
the premises in violation of any present or future law, rule or
regulation of the United States or of the State of Utah, or in
violation of any county or municipal ordinance or regulation
applicable thereto.
6. CARE OP BUILDING BY TENANT: Tenant agrees to keep
the interior of the building and the improvements on the premises
inside and outside the building and the grounds in good condition
and repair including proper servicing and maintenance of all
equipment. The equipment and fixtures to be maintained include
without limitation, lighting fixtures, heating and air conditioning
equipment, truck dock bumpers, overhead freight doors (including
all repairs thereto) and electrical wiring and plumbing systems.
Tenant agrees to contract with a qualified heating and air
conditioning service company for periodic maintenance and service
of HVAC equipment. Such service to be at a minimum twice per year.
Such work by Tenant also includes cleaning and painting the
interior of the premises as Tenant deems necessary in order to

maintain

said

premises

in a clean,
2

attractive

and sanitary
^
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condition.
Tenant shall keep the vehicular parking areas,
pedestrian walkways, entranceways and docks reasonably free from
icicles, ice and snow and shall keep the grounds surrounding the
demised premises clean, promptly removing therefrom all trash,
rubbish, cartons or other debris. If the Tenant fails to do any of
the foregoing as herein required Landlord may elect to proceed
under one or more of its remedies as set forth in Paragraph 24 of
this Lease.
7. REPAIR OF BUILDING BY LANDLORD: Landlord agrees for
the term of this Lease to maintain in good condition, subject to
such conditions as Tenant has accepted at the time of taking
possession, the components of the demised premises, unless said
walls, floor, foundation, roof or other structural components are
damaged as a result of Tenant's, or its employees and agents,
actions or breach of the provisions of this Lease. Landlord shall
not, however, be obligated to make any such repairs until written
notice of the need of repair shall have been given to the Landlord
by the Tenant and after such notice is so given, the Landlord shall
have a reasonable time in which to make such repairs. Landlord
shall not be liable for any resulting damage to the contents unless
it fails to diligently proceed to correct such defect after receipt
of written notice.
8.
INSTALLATION, ALTERATIONS AND REMOVALS:
It is
expressly agreed and understood that the Tenant will make no
alterations, additions or betterments to, or installations
("alterations") upon the leased premises without the prior written
approval of the Landlord which approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Such alterations, if approved, shall be made at Tenant's
expense. All such alterations shall become a part of the premises
and may not be removed by Tenant at termination of this Lease
unless Landlord gives written notice to Tenant to remove all or
some part of such alterations, in which event Tenant shall remove
such alterations upon termination.
9. ERECTION AND REMOVAL OP SIGNS: Subject to the
restrictions of this Paragraph, Tenant may place suitable signs on
the leased premises for the purpose of indicating the nature of the
business carried on by the Tenant in said premises. Such signs
shall be approved by the Landlord in writing prior to their
erection, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld, and
shall not damage the leased premises in any manner. Tenant shall
remove all signs prior to the expiration of the term.
10. GLASS: Tenant agrees to immediately replace all
glass broken or damaged during the term of this Lease with glass of
the same quality as that broken or damaged.
11. RIGHT OF ENTRY BY LANDLORD: The Tenant at any time
during the term of this Lease shall permit inspection including
environmental sampling or testing of the demised premises during
reasonable business hours by the Landlord's agents or representatives for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of the demised
premises and compliance with governmental laws and regulations, and
in order that the Landlord may make such repairs as may be required
to be made by the Landlord under the terms of this Lease. Sixty
(60) days prior to the expiration of this Lease, Landlord may post
suitable notices on the demised premises that the same are "To Let"
and may show the premises to prospective tenants at reasonable
times.
Landlord shall not, however, thereby unnecessarily
interfere with the use of demised premises by the Tenant.
12. PAYMENT OP UTILITIES: Tenant shall pay all charges
for water, sewer, heat, gas, electricity, telephone and other
public utilities used on the premises.
13.

PAYMENT OP CERTAIN INCREASES IN PROPERTY TAXES AND

INSURANCE:
3
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A.
Tenant shall further pay to Landlord any amount by
which the real property taxes on the premises (
Building E-13
Section 4-A - 16,000 so. ft. ), and any expenses incurred by
Landlord to reduce property taxes allocable to the premises, for
any year during the term of 1Ais Lease commencing with the calendar
year
1993
exceed those for
1992
(the "base year11) .
Taxes for the base year on the premises (land and improvements,
which is proportionately allocated among the several premises
contained within each tax parcel) are calculated as follows:
.704
Acres
X
S13.019.72
Demised Premises Fair Market Value

1992

Tax Rate

«
«

«

$

9,165.88
34,660.00

$

43,825.88
.016836

Base Year Taxes Due on Demised Premises - $
737.85
The same method of calculation shall be used for each
subsequent year, including adjustments for alterations and new
improvements made to the premises.
Landlord will provide Tenant each year with a complete
computation of the taxes for the demised premises and within thirty
(30) days thereafter Tenant will pay Landlord the increase in taxes
over the base year taxes.
Real property taxes include all assessments and other
governmental levies, ordinary and extraordinary, foreseen and
unforeseen, which are assessed or imposed upon the premises or
become payable during the term of this Lease.
B. Tenant shall also pay to Landlord any amount by which
the property insurance premiums allocable to the demised premises
for any year during the term of this Lease exceed the annual
premium of S
135.28
presently paid by Landlord for the demised
premises prior to Tenant*s occupancy.
In determining whether
increased premiums are allocable to the demised premises, any
schedules or rating procedures, as well as general rate increases,
as determined by the organization issuing the insurance shall be
conclusive evidence of the several items and charges which make up
the insurance rates and premiums on the demised premises. Landlord
will provide Tenant with a complete computation of any premium
increase on the demised premises and within thirty (30) days
thereafter Tenant will pay Landlord the insurance premium increase
as set forth in the computation.
C. If this Lease is terminated at other than the end of
a calendar year, all amounts payable by Tenant to Landlord under
the provisions of this Paragraph 13 shall be prorated on the basis
of a 360-day year, 30 days allocated to each month.
14.
ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLETTING:
Tenant shall not
transfer or assign this Lease or any interest therein nor sublet or
otherwise make available ("transfer") to any third party any part
of the demised premises without first notifying Landlord in writing
and receiving the written consent of Landlord to such transfer!
The written notice to Landlord shall describe the area to be
transferred and the rent and other consideration receivable for
such transfer. A transfer by Tenant without the written consent of
Landlord first received shall permit Landlord to terminate this
Lease pursuant to Paragraph 24.
No transfer consented to by Landlord shall relieve Tenant
of its obligations hereunder, and Tenant shall continue to be
liable as principal as though no transfer had been made.
It is
agreed that a transfer by corporate merger or to an affiliated
corporation shall not be subject to the provisions of this
Paragraph 14 so long as the transferee has a net worth equal to or

in excess of the net worth of Tenant.

*—jj?
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15.

DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION:

A. If the demised premises or any part thereof shall be
damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty, Landlord shall
promptly repair all such damage and restore the demised premises
without expense to Tenant, subject to delays due to adjustment of
insurance claims, strikes and other causes beyond Landlord's
control. If such damage or destruction shall render the premises
untenable in whole or in part, the rent shall be abated wholly or
proportionately as the case may be until the damage shall be
repaired and the premises restored. If the damage or destruction
shall be so extensive as to require the substantial rebuilding
(i.e., expenditure of twenty-five (25%) percent or more of
replacement costs) of any one building included in the demised
premises, either party may elect to terminate this Lease by written
notice to the other within thirty (30) days after the occurrence of
such damage or destruction.
B. Tenant and Landlord hereby mutually release and waive
their entire right of recovery against the other party for any and
all loss or damage to the improvements, all personal property of
Tenant, and any installations, betterments or improvements added to
the building by Tenant, where such loss is occasioned, caused or
incurred by, or results from fire windstorm, hail, explosion, riot
attending strike, civil commotion, aircraft, vehicles, smoke and
vandalism and all other perils which are insurable against, whether
said loss occurred or was caused by the negligence of the Tenant or
Landlord, their agents, servants, employees, sublessees or
concessionaires, or otherwise. Landlord and Tenant each further
warrant that insurance companies insuring Landlord or Tenant shall
have no rights against the other, whether by assignments, subrogation or otherwise.
Willful misconduct of a criminal nature
lawfully attributable to either party shall to the extent that said
conduct contributes to loss or damage not be excused under this
Paragraph.
16. AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER SYSTEM:
Landlord agrees to
maintain the Automatic Sprinkler System to conform with the
requirements of the Utah Fire Rating Bureau for grading the
building as an Automatic Sprinklered Building. Tenant agrees to
repair any damage to this system arising out of its occupancy, and
to hold Landlord free and harmless from damage to or destruction of
any and all property resulting from leakage of said Automatic
Sprinkler System, during the term of this Lease or any extension
thereof, or any holdover occupancy.
17.

OVERHEAD CRANES:

Delete

18.
INDEMNIFICATIONS:
Tenant shall pay and shall
indemnify and hold Landlord and its principals, employees and
agents harmless from and against any and all liabilities, fines,
losses, damages, costs (including attorney's fees and expenses)
causes of action, claims or judgments of any nature whatsoever,
unless due to the negligence or willful misconduct of landlord or
its principals, employees or agents, in connection with any and all
of the following:
(a) any injury to, or the death of, any person on
the premises or upon adjoining streets or walks, or in any way
related to Tenant's use or occupancy of the premises;
(b) any theft of or damage to or destruction of
goods, wares, merchandise and all other property of Tenant or
others located on the premises or arising from Tenant's use of
the premises;
(c)
any negligent, careless or willful act of
Tenant or any of its agents, contractors, servants, employees,
assigns or subtenants, licensees or invitees, if any;
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(d)
any violation by Tenant of any covenant,
restriction, agreement or condition of this Lease; violation
by Tenant of any contract or agreement to which Tenant is a
party relating to Tenant's use of the premises, or violation
by Tenant of any restriction, law, ordinance or regulation
affecting the premises or any part thereof including the
occupancy or use thereof.
Each of these indemnifications shall survive the expiration or
termination of this Lease.
19.
INSURANCE:
Tenant agrees to carry adequate
Workmen^ Compensation Insurance to comply with the legal requirements of the State of Utah. Tenant agrees to carry adequate or
appropriate Commercial General Liability insurance insuring against
all liability exposure to third parties arising out of Tenant's
operations or use of the premises, in a company or companies
authorized to issue insurance in Utah, and to furnish to the
Landlord Certificates of such insurance which include a thirty (30)
day notice to the Landlord prior to any cancellation or reduction
thereof by the company or companies.
20.
SURRENDER 07 PREMISES: Tenant agrees to surrender
up the demised premises at the expiration, or sooner termination of
this Lease, or any extension thereof, in the same condition, as
when said premises were delivered to the Tenant, or as altered,
pursuant to the provisions of this Lease, ordinary wear, tear and
damage by the elements excepted. Tenant shall also remove all of
its personal property from the demised premises not later than the
time of termination.
Tenant specifically covenants that upon
termination the premises will be free of any hazardous waste
material and that Tenant will be responsible for returning the
premises to a condition meeting all requirements as may at such
time or thereafter as may be imposed by governmental agencies
regulating the handling of hazardous waste materials.
21.
HOLDOVER:
Should Tenant holdover the demised
premises or any part thereof after the expiration of the term of
this Lease, unless otherwise agreed in writing, such holding over
shall constitute a tenancy from month-to-month only, and Tenant
shall pay a sum equal to one and one-half (1-1/2) times the monthly
rental provided herein, payable monthly in advance, but otherwise
on the same terms and conditions as herein provided, except as to
any provisions hereof relating to renewals of extensions.
22.
QUIET ENJOYMENT: If and so long as the Tenant pays
the rents reserved by this Lease and performs and observes all the
covenants and provisions hereof the Landlord will, throughout the
term of this Lease, warrant and defend the Tenant in the enjoyment
and peaceful possession of the demised premises against all parties
claiming a title to the premises superior to Landlord^ and against
all parties claiming by through or under Landlord.
23.
WAIVER OP COVENANTS: It is agreed that the waiving
of any of the covenants of this Lease by either party shall be
limited to the particular instance and shall not be deemed to waive
any other breaches of such covenant or any provision herein
contained; nor shall waiver of any breach by another tenant be
deemed to waive any breach by Tenant.
24.

DEFAULT PROVISIONS:

A. The following events shall be considered events of
default by Tenant:
(i)
If default shall be made in the due and
punctual payment of any rent or other sums payable under this
Lease or any part thereof, when and as the same shall become
due and payable, and such default shall continue for a period

of ten (10) business days; or

<—^j-
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(ii)
If default shall be made by Tenant in the
performance of or compliance with any of the covenants,
agreements, terms or provisions contained in this Lease, and
such default shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days
after written notice thereof from Landlord to Tenant, except
that in connection with a default not susceptible of being
cured with due diligence within thirty days, the time within
which Tenant shall cure the same shall be extended for such
time as may be necessary to cure the same with all due
diligence, provided Tenant commences within 7 days of the date
of receipt of such notice to cure the same and proceeds
diligently to affect such cure and further provided that such
period of time shall not be so extended as to subject Landlord
to any criminal liability; or
(iii) If the leased premises or any part thereof
shall be abandoned or vacated or if Tenant shall be dispossessed therefrom by or under any authority other than Landlord.
B.
Upon the occurrence of any such events of default,
mdlord shall have the right to pursue any one or more of the
allowing remedies:
(i)
Make performance for Tenant of any covenant
or condition which Tenant is in default of and for the purpose
advance such amounts as may be necessary. Any amounts so
advanced or any expense incurred by Landlord by reason of the
failure of Tenant to comply with any covenant, agreement,
obligation or provision of this Lease or in defending any
action to which Landlord may be subjected by reason of any
such failure shall be due and payable to Landlord on demand,
and interest shall accrue thereon from the date of expenditure
at the rate of 18% per annum.
(ii) Terminate this Lease and end the term hereof
by giving to Tenant written notice of such termination, in
which event Landlord shall be entitled to recover from Tenant
the amount of rent reserved in this Lease for the then balance
of the term hereof; or
(iii) Without retaking possession of the premises
or terminating this Lease, to sue monthly for and recover all
rents, other required payments due under this Lease, and other
sums, including damages and legal fees, at any time and from
time to time accruing hereunder; or
(iv)
Upon notice to all interested parties, reenter and take possession of the premises or any part thereof
and repossess the same as of Landlord's former estate and
expel Tenant and those claiming through or under Tenant and
remove the effects of both or either (forcibly, if necessary)
without being deemed guilty in any manner of trespass and
without prejudice to any remedies for arrears of rent.
Landlord may relet the premises or any part thereof for such
term or terms and at such rental or rentals and upon such
other terms and conditions as Landlord may deem advisable
with the right to make alterations and repairs to the premises. Such re-entry or taking of possession of the premises by
Landlord shall not be construed as an election on Landlord's
part to terminate this Lease unless, a written notice of
termination be given to Tenant or unless the termination
thereof be decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction. In
the event of Landlord's election to proceed under this
subparagraph, then such repossession shall not relieve Tenant
of its obligations and liabilities under this Lease, all of
which shall survive such repossession, and Tenant shall pay to
Landlord as current liquidated damages, the rent and other
sums hereinabove provided which would be payable hereunder if

such repossession had not occurred, less the net proceeds (if
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any) of reletting of the premises after deducting all of the
Landlord's expenses in connection with such reletting,
including but without limitation all repossession costs,
brokerage commissions, legal expenses, attorneys' fees,
expenses of employees, alteration costs and expenses of
preparation for such reletting. Such reletting may be in the
name of Landlord or otherwise, for such term or terms (which
may be greater or less than the period which would otherwise
have constituted the balance of the term of this Lease) and on
such conditions (which may include concessions or free rent)
as Landlord, in its uncontrolled discretion, may determine and
may collect and receive the rents therefor. Landlord shall
make a reasonable effort to relet the premises to acceptable
tenants, but Landlord shall in no way be responsible or liable
for any failure to relet the demised premises or any part
thereof or for any failure to collect any rent or other
charges due upon such reletting.
Tenant shall pay such
current damages to Landlord on the days on which the rent
would have been payable hereunder if possession had not been
retaken and Landlord shall be entitled to receive the same
from Tenant on such day.
Use of any of the foregoing remedies shall not preclude
pursuit of any of the other remedies provided for herein. Failure
by Landlord to enforce one or more of the remedies herein provided
upon an event of default shall not be deemed or construed to
constitute a waiver of such default, or of any other violation or
breach of any of the terms, provisions and covenants herein
contained.
25.

BANKRUPTCY OR INSOLVENCY:

A. In the event that Tenant shall become a debtor under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and Tenant's trustee or Tenant
shall elect to assume this Lease for the purpose of assigning the
same or otherwise, such election and assignment may be made only if
the provisions of Paragraphs 26.B. and 26.D. are satisfied. If
Tenant or Tenant's trustee shall fail to elect to assume this Lease
within 60 days after the filing of such petition or such additional
time as provided by the court within such 60-day period, this Lease
shall be deemed to have been rejected.
Immediately thereupon
Landlord shall be entitled to possession of the Premises without
further obligation to Tenant or Tenant's trustee and this Lease
shall terminate, but Landlord's right to be compensated for damages
in any such proceeding shall survive.
B. In the event that a petition for reorganization or
adjustment of debts is filed concerning Tenant under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, or a proceeding is filed under Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code and is transferred to Chapter 11, Tenant's
trustee or Tenant, as debtor-in-possession, must elect to assume
this Lease within 120 days from the date of the filing of the
petition under Chapter 11 or Tenant's trustee or the debtor-inpossession has failed to perform all of Tenant's obligations under
this Lease within the time periods (excluding grace periods)
required for such performance, no election by Tenant's trustee or
the debtor-in-possession to assume this Lease, whether under
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, shall be effective unless each of the
following conditions has been satisfied:
(1) Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession
has cured all defaults under the Lease, or has provided
Landlord with Assurance (as defined below) that it will cure,
(i) all defaults susceptible of being cured by the payment of
money within 10 days from the date of such assumption and that
it will cure all other defaults under this Lease which are
susceptible of being cured by the performance of any act
promptly after the date of such assumption.

(2)

Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession
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has compensated, or has provided Landlord with Assurance that
within 10 days from the date of such assumption it will
compensate Landlord for any actual pecuniary loss incurred by
Landlord arising from the default of Tenant, Tenant 1 s trustee,
or the debtor-in-possession indicated in any statement of
actual pecuniary loss sent by Landlord to T e n a n t s trustee or
the debtor-in-possession.
(3) Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession
has provided Landlord with Assurance of the future performance
of each of the obligations under this Lease of Tenant,
Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession, and if Tenant's
trustee or the debtor-in-possession has provided such Assurance Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession shall also
(i) deposit with Landlord, as security for the timely payment
of rent hereunder, an amount equal to three (3) monthly
installments of rent which shall be applied to installments of
rent in the inverse order in which such installments shall
become due provided all the terms and provisions of this Lease
shall have been complied with, and (ii) pay in advance to
Landlord on the date rent is due and payable one-twelfth of
Tenant's other annual obligations pursuant to this Lease. The
obligations imposed upon Tenant's trustee or the debtor-inpossession by this Paragraph shall continue with respect to
Tenant or any assignee of this Lease after the completion of
bankruptcy proceedings.
For purposes of this Paragraph 25, Landlord and Tenant acknowledge
that "Assurance" shall mean no less than: Tenant's trustee or the
debtor-in-possession has and will continue to have sufficient
unencumbered assets after the payment of all secured obligations
and administrative expenses to assure Landlord that sufficient
funds will be available to fulfill the obligations of Tenant under
this Lease and there shall have been deposited with Landlord
sufficient cash to secure to Landlord the obligation of Tenant to
cure the defaults under this Lease, monetary and/or non-monetary
within the time periods set forth above.
C. In the event that this Lease is assumed in accordance
with Paragraph 25(B) and thereafter Tenant is liquidated or files
a subsequent petition for reorganization or adjustment of debts
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Landlord may, at its
option, terminate this Lease and all rights of Tenant hereunder, by
giving Tenant notice of its election to so terminate within 30 days
after the occurrence of either of such events.
D. If Tenant's trustee or the debtor-in-possession has
assumed the Lease pursuant to the terms and provisions of Paragraphs 25(A) or 25(B) for the purpose of assigning (or elects to
assign) this Lease, this Lease may be so assigned only if the
proposed assignee has provided adequate assurance of future
performance of all of the terms, covenants and conditions of this
Lease to be performed by Tenant. Landlord shall be entitled to
receive all cash proceeds of such assignment.
As used herein
"adequate assurance of future performance" shall mean that no less
than each of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(1) The proposed assignee has furnished Landlord
with either (i) a current financial statement audited by a
certified public accountant indicating a net worth and working
capital in amounts which Landlord reasonably determines to be
sufficient to assure the future performance by such assignee
of Tenant's obligations under this Lease or (ii) a guarantee
or guarantees, in form and substance satisfactory to Lessor,
from one or more persons with a net worth satisfactory to
Landlord.
(2) The proposed assignment will not release or
impair any guaranty of the obligations of Tenant (including

the proposed assignee) under this Lease,
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E.
When, pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, Tenants
trustee or the debtor-in-possession shall be obliged to pay
reasonable use and occupancy charges for the use of the premises,
such charges shall not be less than the Fixed Rent and Additional
Rent payable by Tenant under this Lease.
F.
Neither the whole nor any portion of Tenant's
interest in this Lease or its estate in the premises shall pass to
any trustee, receiver, assignee for the benefit of creditors,
or any other person or entity, or otherwise by operation of law
unless Landlord shall have consented to such transfer in writing.
No acceptance by Landlord of rent or any other payments from any
such trustee, receiver, assignee, person or other entity shall be
deemed to constitute such consent by Landlord nor shall it be
deemed a waiver of Landlord's right to terminate this Lease for any
transfer of Tenant's interest under this Lease without such
consent.
26. ATTORNEYS FEES: In the event either party shall
enforce the terms of this Lease by suit or otherwise, the party at
fault shall pay the costs and expenses incident thereto, including
reasonable attorney's fees.
27. FAILURE TO PERFORM COVENANT: Except for Tenant's
obligation to pay rent and to pay other monies including maintenance of insurance, any failure on the part of either party to
perform any obligation hereunder, and any delay in doing any act
required hereby shall be excused if such failure or delay is caused
by any strike, lockout or governmental restriction to the extent
and for the period that such continues.
28. RIGHTS OF SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS: The covenants and
agreements contained in this Lease shall apply to, inure to the
benefit of, and be binding upon the parties hereto and upon their
respective successors in interest and legal representatives.
29.
TIKE:
Time is of the essence of this Lease and
every term, covenant and condition herein contained.
30.
LIENS: Tenant agrees not to permit any lien for
monies owing by Tenant to remain against the premises for a period
of more than thirty (30) days following discovery of the same by
Tenant; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall
prevent Tenant, in good faith and for good cause, from contesting
in the courts the claim or claims of any person, firm or corporation growing out of Tenant's operation of the demised premises or
costs of improvements by Tenant on the said premises, and the
postponement of payment of such claim or claims, until such contest
shall finally be decided by the courts shall not be a violation of
this Lease or any covenant hereof. Should any such lien be filed
and not released or discharged or action not commenced to declare
the same invalid within thirty (30) days after discovery of same by
Tenant, Landlord may at Landlord's option (but without any
obligation so to do) pay or discharge such lien and may likewise
pay and discharge any taxes, assessments or other charges against
the premises which Tenant is obligated hereunder to pay and which
may or might become a lien on said premises. Tenant agrees to
repay any sums so paid by the Landlord upon demand therefor,
together with interest at the rate of eighteen (18%) percent per
annum from the date any such payment is made.
31. LIMITATION OF LANDLORD'S LIABILITY: The obligations
of Landlord under this Lease do not constitute personal obligations
of the individual partners of Landlord and Tenant shall look solely
to the real estate that is the subject of this Lease and to no
other assets of the Landlord for satisfaction of any liability in
respect of this Lease and will not seek recourse against the

individual partners of Landlord or any of their personal assets for
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such satisfaction.
J*., EMINENT DOMAIN: In the event any power of eminent
domain shall ever be used by any government authority, federal,
state, county or municipal, or by any other party vested by law
with such power, for the taking of the premises or any substantial
portion thereof, and if such taking shall prevent the full use and
enjoyment of the premises by Tenant for the purposes set forth
herein, Tenant shall have the right thereupon to terminate this
Lease by giving written notice to Landlord.
In the event of the taking of a substantial portion less
than the whole of the premises, Tenant may elect, in lieu of
exercising its right of termination, to continue in possession,
under the terms of this Lease, of the portion of the premises not
so taken, and the rent hereunder shall be abated by such proportion
as the number of square feet of the building floor space taken
bears to the total number of square feet of building floor space
included in the premises. In such event, if any portion of any
building or buildings comprising the premises shall have been
taken, Landlord shall restore such building or buildings by
repairing and enclosing the same to the extent necessary and
possible to provide an integral and complete building suitable for
the purposes set forth in Paragraph 2 hereof, giving effect to the
reduced size of the premises.
Any award or compensation for damages, whether resulting
by judgement or verdict after trial or by agreement under threat of
condemnation, applying to the leasehold interest created hereby,
shall be paid to Landlord, and Tenant hereby authorizes Landlord as
attorney-in-fact of Tenant to enter into any agreement or compromise, execute any instrument of transfer or assignment or otherwise, and do any other acts in connection with such leasehold
interest and such eminent domain proceedings as Landlord, in its
discretion, shall determine; provided, however, Landlord shall hold
the proceeds of any such compensation, award or settlement (other
than severance damages which may be awarded to Landlord by reason
of the severance of the premises or a portion thereof from other
lands owned by Landlord) in trust for the benefit of Landlord,
Tenant and any mortgagee as their interests may appear.
When Tenant claims an interest in any such proceeds,
Tenant's leasehold interest for purposes of measuring Tenant's
interest in such proceeds shall be deemed limited to the remainder
of the term of this Lease then in effect, and no future right of
extension or renewal at Tenant's option shall be construed to
enlarge Tenant's leasehold interest for such purposes.
33. SUBORDINATION OF LEASE TO MORTGAGES ON THE DEMISED
PREMISES: This Lease shall be subject and subordinate to any
mortgage (or trust deed) now existing or hereafter placed on the
demised premises given to secure a loan made by a lender to
Landlord, and to any renewals, replacements, extensions or
consolidations thereof, which shall contain a provision that, so
long as Tenant shall not be in default in the performance of its
obligations under this Lease in such manner and after such notice
as would entitle Landlord to terminate this Lease, the holder of
such mortgage shall not disturb the possession of Tenant or
terminate this Lease.
34.
REPRESENTATIONS:
Tenant acknowledges that the
Landlord has made no agreement or promise concerning the alteration, improvement, adaptation or repair of any part of the
premises which has not been set forth herein, and that this Lease
contains all the agreements made and entered into between the
Tenant and the Landlord.
35. LIGHTS ON EXTERIOR OP BUILDING. Tenant shall burn
the lights affixed to the exterior of any building it occupies from

one (l) hour after sunset to one fi) hour before sunrise nightly.
±1

~M>
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36.
OUTSIDE STORAGE:
Other than
self-propelled
vehicles, nothing may be stored outside of a building without
written consent of the Landlord.
37.

SECURITY DEPOSIT:

Delete

38. GARBAGE COLLECTION:
Cost of garbage collection
shall be borne by Tenant. Arrangement for such service shall be
made by Tenant, subject to approval of Landlord.
39.
RULES AHD REGULATIONS:
Landlord has found it
necessary to post vehicular traffic control signs on streets and
may from time to time impose certain traffic and parking rules and
regulations at Freeport Center. Tenant agrees to comply with, and
use reasonable efforts to cause its employees and other personnel,
to comply with such posted signs and rules and regulations, and
Tenant shall be responsible for causing its employees to park in
designated areas and to operate their motor vehicles within posted
speed limits and in accordance with other traffic signs.
40. CONSTRUCTION OP LEASE: Words of any gender used in
this Lease shall be held to include any other gender, and words in
the singular number shall be held to include the plural when the
sense requires. Interpretation, construction and performance of
this Lease shall be governed by the laws of Utah. Each of the
parties who execute this Lease as Tenant shall be jointly and
severally liable for all obligations of Tenant under this Lease.
41. PARAGRAPH HEADINGS: The paragraph headings as to
the contents of particular paragraphs herein are inserted only for
convenience and are in no way to be construed as part of such
paragraph or as a limitation on the scope of the particular
paragraph to which they refer.
42. NOTICES: Any notice required or permitted to be
given hereunder shall be deemed sufficient if given by communication in writing by express over-night mail, by public or private
carrier, postage prepaid and certified, and addressed as follows:
If to the Landlord, at the following address:
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES
P.0, Box 1325 - Preeport Center
Clearfield, Utah 84016
If to the Tenant, at the following address:
ENERCO INC.
45 North station Plaza
Great Neck, NY 11021
43. OPTION TO TERMINATE LEASE - Bldg. E-13 Sec, 3-A:
Tenant shall have the option to terminate its other lease for Bldg.
E-13 Sec. 3-A on the following conditions: 1) Tenant must provide
Landlord 90 days written notice of its intent to terminate the
Bldg. E-13 Sec. 3-A Lease; 2) Any termination shall be at the end
of a month and; and 3) Tenant shall return the premises in a clean
and structurally sound condition pursuant to the terms of the
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused these
presents to be executed the day and year first above written.
LANDLORD:
FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES

Its
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Michael L. Schwab [A4662],
Lloyd A . Hardcastle [A507?]
SCHWAB & HARDCASTLE
225 South 200 West
P.O. Box 118
Farmington, Utah 84025Hj)ll8
Telephone: (801) 451-6560
Fax: (801) 451-8216
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND DIStRICT COURT OF THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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ENERCO,, IMC
AFFIDAVIT OF JANES KIM
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Defendants.
The undersigned

individual!

James

Kim, being

duly

sworn,

hereby states the foJ 1 owing:
1.

I am the Managing Director

for the plaintiff in this

case, ENERCO, Inc •, a. kj, a: ENERCO of IJtah, Inc. I "ENERCO" ) .
2.

I

dill

fill ly

tlflii'i 1 { ai

will Ih "I! In*

I" rti "1 ss

rtiifl

c i. rciumst" anctts

s u r r o u n d i n g t h i s c a s e arid a l l s La tun IIIIIII lilts made b e l o w a r e b a s e d on my
own personal knowledge.
3

KNli 111,!1 n"!

in 'I.

im

I I'Li'11

busiliesn

equipment, and other materials categorized

1

I

| in iJieibitiiyi

as

ej^tiiiisive

i i pint" Inn i t;tie

702/99

13:16

©

ig002

U.S. Government in large nlotsn and reselling those items to other
individuals and entities throughout the world.
4.

In 1995, ENERcOhad an extremely large warehouse at the

Freeport Center in Clearfield/ Utah/ full of the type of equipment
and materials referenced above, which ENERCO had purchased and was
storing for future sale to its worldwide customers•
5.

In 1995, ENE^CCJ had many millions of dollars worth of
i

such equipment stored at} its warehouse at the Freeport Center. The
J
i

management of Freeport (tenter Associates ("Freeport") was aware of
the unique type of equipment and materials I had in the warehouse,
and also was aware of tfie! large volume of that equipment.
6.

I personally] entered

into the lease agreements with

Freeport on behalf of ENERCO.
7.

At the time thofce agreements were entered into, I spoke

specifically with a Manager whose first name was "Steve." Because

I!

of the high value of ENERCO! s property, I questioned him about
i

security at the Freeport Center. I was given verbal assurances and
representations from him; regarding the security at the Freeport
Center.

Among other things, I was told that there would be

security guards protecting the gate at the Freeport: Center, that
n

there is ample security here," that ENERCO!s property would be

safe,

and that he h^d never

heard

of anyone

stealing

from

Freeport1s tenants.
8.

These statements were very important to me in deciding to

store ENERCOfs valuable goods at the Freeport Center, and I relied
upon them in making my jdecision to do so.

<Q»

702/39
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At the !::::i me thje lease arrangements were m'\ In

9.

written materials

" 3m§ Ereepor

' was gi^-an

those ma Larials,

J. I « • -is

unequivocally stated th,r
Freeport Center is protected by five miles of ten foot
chain link fencingL ; Gates are manned or locked during
hours of darkness. A roving security guard patrols the
center's 735 acres |oni weekends, at night and on holidays.
10'. The materlaljs -given to me 11 -;u \\t\w
i I 'I thiif the
Freeporl: C E n tex

wa s protected by

sys tem' "! which

was

Jconnecled

imi

EH

•» lectron i r survei 1 lance
I li<

Il i i'

"HIill.er

Administrative Offices and patrol vehicle." I also relie

, these

written materials and the promises and representations made therein
in

11

niiiixg t o

store

jENERCO's mat: si ; :: :!!; a 3! ,s an- ::i • & 3 1 i::i 5 11 1= lit

2

•Freeport Cent 1 1
] I

1 Il

II

Il

never given Freepor!

if

ftu»

thpfl «

)

" MI

- i

,.• , notice 01 u;

whatsoeve

^ar

ENERCO would b e ending jts lease or moving its property out of the
Freeport '< "ttiil -."r.
12.

Freeport 1 s front office knew that 1 ofter , went overseas

on extended trips 9 and also knew that while 1 was on such, txi ps no
1

such trips, I, wouid leaye :my keys to the wa i: e house with Freeport ! s
fro 11 of f i ce so that no one else could gain

a c 2 e ss

tc the

warehouse.
13.
which

tin

Prior to the time when 1 left o n m y o v e r s e a s trip during
Hiietf"

'mi 1 11 if 1 itil

r w e n t tun F t p p f i i n I

H 11! t 1 v

mil

1 M | 1 n HUM!

1

the empl

1 1 1 n line 1 nil I 1 t

extended p e r i o d of tim^.

LJidiL I would be out of town f o r

As was my p r a c t i c e ,

an

1 gave F r e e p o r t " s
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office the keys to my building so that no one else could gain
access to the building while I was gone.

All of the thefts

occurred while Freeport had my keys and knew I was out of town.
14*

Based on the veribal promises and representations made by

Freeport, the provisions of the written lease agreement, the fact
that Freeport had my keys and knew I was out of town, and the other
facts

set

forth

Interrogatories

in

ENERCO's

written

answers

to

Freeport's

in this ;case, I feel

strongly

that Freeport

breached its agreements and promises made to me, and was negligc&nt
i

in allowing several million dollars of our property to be stolen.
i

15.

I h a v e r e a d t h i s ! a f f i d a v i t and t h e s t a t e m e n t s made h e r e i n

a r e t r u e and c o r r e c t .
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT.
DATED t h i s

JUL-9

;day o f J u l y ,

1999.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA )

0UL
STATE UNITED
0 f SSTATE
i S ^OPEA&fifta}:
L
S

COUNTY OF

)

:
i

On the*"** ~ ^ ^ ^ day of July, 1999, personally appeared

before, me Jamas Kim, whose identity has been proven on the basis of
satisfactory evidence, being first duly sworn, acknowledges that he
executed the foregoing instrument, for the purposes stated therein,
of his own voluntary act,

NOTARY PUBLIC
BXSHCQ\Aff-Ki«-702
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i c h e l e NT. Siders
Vice Consul

